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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Vs.

Case No.

17663

ROY HUTCHISON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by Amended Information with Forcible
Sodomy; in that on or about the 18th day of October, 1980, in
violation of Section 76-5-403, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, the
Defendant engaged in a sexual act involving the genitals of one
SCOTT HARRIS and the mouth of the Defendant without the consent of

said SCOTT HARRIS.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the Fourth Judicial District Court of

Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge, on the 19th
day of January, 1981, the Defendant having waived his rights to a
jury trial, and said Court found the Defendant guilty as charged.
Defendant was sentenced by the Court on March 13, 1981, to serve
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1-15 years in the Utah State Prison.

Notice of Appeal was filed

on April 5, 1981.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
judgment of guilty entered in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State's Complaining Witness, SCOTT HARRIS, a minor, was a
resident of a Boy's Ranch in Provo Canyon.

On October 17, 1980,

he had just returned from an out-of-town visit with his parents
and had arrived late that night in the Provo Continental Trailways
Bus building. (R., at 17) Defendant, ROY HUTCHISON, had spent the
late evening of October 17, 1980, watching television and drinking
liquor at his residence.

Early in the morning of October 18,

1980, he walked about half a block to a telephone booth and made a
phone call.

There he met SCOTT HARRIS and invited him to stay the

night at the Defendant's home.

HARRIS admits he knew that the

Defendant had been drinking heavily.

(R., at 25)

The Defendant and the Complaining Witness spent some time
drinking liquor and watching television at the Defendant's
residence, before the Defendant passed out. (R., at 73-75)
However, witnesses later found SCOTT HARRIS unclothed and huddled
over a fire made of his own clothes outside.

-2-
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SCOTT HARRIS'S further explanation of the incident is
contained in a report made by the investigating officer of the
Provo Police Department, ROBERT H. SMITH, October 18, 1980.

(R.,

at 46-48) HARRIS indicated that the Defendant had dressed himself
in women's clothing, and that he had got HARRIS "drunk" and that
the Defendant had removed HARRIS'S clothing and had attempted to
have anal intercourse with him.

However at trial on January 19,

1981, HARRIS testified differently.

At trial he claimed that

the Defendant got him drunk, that HARRIS passed out and awoke when
the Defendant attempted to perform fellatio on him.

(R., at 20-22)

When counsel for the Defendant attempted to have the Police Report
introduced into evidence to impeach the credibility of the State's
witness, the trial Court excluded the same on the basis of
hearsay.

(R., at 48-50)

Defendant was then convicted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS CONTAINED IN A POLICE
REPORT ARE ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES.
In many jurisdictions Police Reports are adA.
missible as substantive evidence under certain
circumstances.
Numerous jurisdictions take the view that Police Reports,
where properly qualified, are themselves admissible as substantive

-3-
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evidence at Trial without the testimony of the recording Police
Officer, provided that care is taken to assure the trustworthiness
of the information contained therein.

Johnson vs. State, 253 A.2d

206 (Del. 1969): State vs. Ing, 497 P.2d 575 (Haw. 1972):

~

vs. State, 261 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. 1970): State vs. Taylor, 486

s.w.

2d 239 (Mo. 1972): State vs. McGeary, 322 A.2d 830 (N.J. 1974);
People vs. Foster, 261 N.E.2d 389 (N.Y. 1972): Comm. vs. Russell,
326 A.2d 303 (Penn. 1974): and Gamble vs. State, 383 S.W.2d 48
(Tenn. 1964).

The general rule in such states is that the Courts

will not allow the admission of anything in the report which would
not be admissible if testified to by the maker of the report.
That is, all personal observations made by a reporting officer and
written in his report are admissible at Trial, although statements
made to the Officer by third persons are admissible in only
limited circumstances.
B. Utah allows the admission of Police Report
contents at least for impeachment purposes.
1. The credibility of a witness may be drawn
into question by his prior inconsistent statements.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-24-1, provides in part:
(I)n every case the credibility of the witness may be
drawn into question, by the manner in which he testifies,
by the character of his testimony, or by evidence effecting
his charactor for truth, honesty or integrity, or by his
motives, or by contradictory evidence
-4-
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Certainly evidence of what the witness has previously stated
to persons in authority constitutes contradictory evidence which
will severely effect the credibility of a witness.

Likewise Rule

20, of Utah Rules of Evidence, provides as follows:
Evidence Generally Affecting Credibility. Subject
to Rules 21 and 22, for the purpose of impairing or
supporting the credibility of a witness, any Party
including the Party calling him may examine him and
introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any statement or conduct by him and any other matter relevent upon the issues of credibility.
The obvious purpose of Rule 20 is to allow the liberal
introduction of evidence to impair or support the credibility of a
witness as the case may be.

Whenever any evidence bearing on the

credibility of a witness can be introduced from another source the
reliability of a witness's testimony can be more clearly
ascertained.

One of the most frequent objections to the

introduction of evidence about a witness's prior inconsistant
statements is that the statement was told to a third party by
means of an out-of-Court statement, and constitutes heresay.
Accordingly the first exception that the legislature of this State
has made as to when heresay evidence may in fact be introduced at
Trial is contained in Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by
a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated is heresay ev-

-5-
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idence and inadmissible at Trial execpt:
(1) Prior
statements of witnesses. A prior statement of a
witness, if the Judge finds that the witness had an
adequate opportunity to perceive the event or condition
which his statement narrates, describes or explains,
provided that (a) it is inconsistant with his present
testimony, or (b) it contains otherwise admissible facts
which the witness denies having stated or has forgotten
since the making of the statement, or (c) it will support testimony made by the witness in the present case
when such testimony has been challenged. (Emphasis added)
Evidence of a witness's prior inconstant statements, when
offered to impeach the credibility of the witness and not to prove
the truth of the matters contained in such statements, are
admissible under the very first exception to the heresay rule.
2. A Policeman's Investigative Report made
within the scope of his duty shortly after
the occurance of a crime is admissable at
trial.
Rule 63 (15), Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
Reports and findings of Public Officials. Subject to
Rule 64 and except for traffic accident reports,
factual data contained in written reports or findings
of fact made by a Public Official of the United States
or of a State or territory of the United States, if
the Judge finds that the making thereof was within the
scope of the duty of such official and that it was his
duty (a) to perform the act reported, or (b) to observe
the act, condition or event reported, or (c) to investigate the facts concerning the act, condition or event
and to make findings or draw conclusions based upon such
investigation.
This Rule clearly contemplates that findings of fact made by

-6-
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an Officer acting within the scope of his duty as well as his
conclusions based on his investigation are admissible as evidence
at Trial under an exception to the Heresay Rule.

The Rule

indicates that the Judge has the discretion to allow the admission
of such evidence if the information is in written reports or
findings made by a Public Official within the scope of the duty of
such Official.

Police Reports qualify as admissible evidence

under this exception except for traffic accident reports, which
are expressly not admissible.

Utah Code Annoted, 1953, Section

78-25-3, states:

Entries in public or other official books or records,
made in the performance of his duty by a Public Officer
of this State or by any other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
Section 78-25-4, provides:
An entry made by an Officer or Board of Officers, or
under the direction and in the presence of either,
in the course of official duty is pr1ma facie evidence
of the facts stated in such entry.
If a Police Report is held to be a public record, or if the
Police Report is made pursuant to his official duty, the facts
contained in such reports are prima facie evidence.

That is, the

facts stated in such reports could be substantive evidence at
Trial and are presumed to be true until controverted by better

-7-
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evidence.

However in the case at bar the evidence contained in

the Police Report was not offered as substantive evidence to prove
the truth of the matters stated therein.

The Reports were simply

offered in a legitimate attempt to impeach the credibility of a
witness whose testimony at Trial differed in substantial respects
from the testimony originally given to the Investigating Police
Officers.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 (13) provides:
Business Entries and the Like. Writtings offered as
memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to
prove the facts stated therein, if the Judge finds
that they were made in the regular course of business
at or about the time of the act, condition or event
recorded, and that the sources of information from
which made and the method and circumstances of their
preperation were such as to indicate their trustworthyness.
Courts and other jurisdictions, as noted above, have
routinely allowed the admission of Police Records as substantive
evidence.

The business entries exception is one of the catagories

under which Courts allow the admission of Police Reports at
trial.

Where the Police Report is prepared pursuant to the

regular course and proceedure of the Police Department, and was
taken at or about the time of the act, condition or event
recorded, and were made under reasonably trustworthy
circumstances, the contents of said Police Report should be

-8-
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admissible as an exception to the Hearsay Rule.
C. The Trial Court abused its discretion in
excluding the Police Report and Officer's
testimony regarding the witnesses prior
inconsistant statements.
In State vs. Young, 516 P.2d 1398 (Utah 1973) the Supreme
court of this State upheld the Defendant's conviction for
Robbery.

The Court found that there was no error in admitting the

prior inconsistant and extrajudicial statements of the Complaining
Witness about the identification of the accussed.

The Complaining

Witness had earlier told the Police that the Defendant was one of
those involved in the Robbery, and that the witness had known him
for about five years.

However at a later lineup the Witness

stated he was unable to identify the Defendant as being present at
the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court upheld the questioning

at Trial by the Prosecutor of the Witness as to his extrajudicial
conversations with the Police Officer under Rules 20 and 63 (1),
Utah Rules of Evidence.
In the case at bar the Complaining Witness also had prior
extrajudicial conversations with Police Officers which he later
contradicted.

The Trial Court should have exercised it's

discretion to allow the impeachment of the credibility of this
witness, because of this change in testimony.

When the State's

-9-
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complaining Witness, SCOTT HARRIS, made his report to the Police
Officer on October 18, 1980, he alleged that the Defendant had
attempted to perform anal intercourse with him, but made no
mention of any purported incident involving the Defendant's mouth
and the Complaining Witness's genitals.

Conversely at Trial the

State's Complaining Witness testified that he awoke finding the
Defendant's mouth upon his genitals.

(R., at 31) When counsel for

the Defense asked the Complaining Witness about his prior statement to the Police Officers regarding the alleged anal
intercourse, the Witness answered in the affirmative, but his
answer was so indecisive that the Court did not require the
Complaining Witness to explain it, (R., at 30).

In other words,

just at the point where the Complaining Witness began showing
obvious signs of indecisiveness and uncertainty, the Trial Court
required Defense Counsel to approach the matter from a different
angle.

The exclusion by the Trial Court of the proffered Police

Report to impeach the credibility of the Complaining Witness was
improper and prejudiced the Defendant.
In State vs Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), the Supreme
Court considered a case where the Defendant had been convicted of
Robbery.

The Court ordered a new Trial because the Defendant's

statement made to a Police Officer shortly after the crime was

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

admitted at Trial and offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in such a statement.

The Court said:

The term heresay is applied to testimony offered to
prove facts which the witness has no personal knowledge, but which have been told to him by others.
He is thus not testifying from his own knowledge or
observation, but is acting as a conduit to relate
that of others. The general rule, to which there
are admittedly many exceptions, is that such testimony is not admissible on the ground that it lacks
trustworthiness for two basic reasons:
(1) The person
who purports to know the facts is not stating them
under oath; (2) he is not present for cross-examination. Other reasons assigned for its unreliability
are the danger of inaccuracy in the witness relaying
what he has been told, and the fact that the jury does not
not have the opportunity to see the person whose declarations are offered as evidence. However it is not every
instance in which a witness relates what he heard someone else say that he is purporting to represent that
the statement he heard is true. The purpose of his
testimony may be simply to prove that someone else has
made a statement without regard to whether it be true or
false. Testimony of this nature does not violate the
Hearsay Rule since the witness is asserting under oath
a fact he personally knows, that is, that the statement
was made, and he is subject to cross-examination concerning such fact. 310 P.2d at 390-391 (Emphasis added)
It is true that statements in a Police Report made by a Third
Party to the reporting Police Officer may not be asserted as
evidence at trial for the truth of the matters stated by a said
Third Party.

That would be heresay.

But the fact that the

Third Party uttered such a statement is a fact which the recording
Police Off ier knows first hand, for he has personally heard the

-11-
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statement.

And when that same Third Party is testifying at Trial

and his testimony differed substantially from his prior extrajudicial statement, this prior statement is admissible to show the
variance in the witness's testimony at Trial.

In the instant case

the Complaining Witness made certain statements to the
Investigating Provo City Police Officer shortly after the alleged
incident.

The statements were duly recorded in a written Police

Report pursuant to the practices of the Provo City Police
Department. (R., at 45, 48) Later the State's

Complaining Witness

purported to describe the same events at Trial, but the statements
at Trial varied significantly from his statements which he made

~

the Investigating Police Officer, ROBERT H. SMITH, immediately
after the alleged crime.

Therefore the admission of OFFICER

SMITH'S report for the limited purpose of impeaching the State's
witness was proper.

OFFICER SMITH was personally present in the

court room and could be cross-examined by the State.

The Trial

Judge's decision to exclude said report constituted an arbitrary
exercise of his descretion and artificially allowed the testimony
of the State's Complaining Witness to stand unimpeached.

Because

the only evidence offered by the State as to the elements of the
alleged crime was the testimony of SCOTT HARRIS, his credibility
became of prime importance in determining whether or not any

-12-
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_.......___

cornpetant evidence existed upon which the Trial Court could find
the Defendant guilty.
In State vs. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980), this Court
affirmed the Defendant's conviction of Aggravated Sexual Assault
and Aggravated Burglary.

The Court found that the testimony of

the Policeman relating the statement of the Defendant's girlfriend
about the Defendant was a legitimate effort to impeach and
discredit the testimony of the girlfriend at trial.

In DeBois vs.

State, 197 P. 176 (Oak. 1921) the Supreme Court of Oaklahoma
reversed and remanded for new trial the Defendant's conviction for
Arson.

The State's case rested almost entirely on circumstantial

evidence buttressed by the testimony of one main witness.

The

Trial Court had sustained the objections on the part of the
Prosecution to attempts by Defense Counsel to impeach this
witness's credibility.

The Court found that it was competant and

proper for Defense Counsel to cross-examine the Complaining
Witness about his prior contradictory or inconsistant statements
made out of Court.

So too, in the case at bar, the statements

made by the Complaining Witness to the Police Officers immediately
after the alleged incident varied significantly from his testimony
at trial.

Therefore admission of that Police Report containing

said statements should have been admitted at Trial for the purpose

-13-
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of impeaching the Witness's credibility.

Utah Courts have

likewise held that a witness's prior inconsistant statements made
to a Police Officer may be introduced at Trial to discredit the
witness's testimony.

See State vs. Stockton, 310 P.2d 398 ( Utah

1957).
In State vs. Mores, 192 P.2d 861 (Utah 1948) the Supreme
Court affirmed a conviction of the Defendant for Murder.

In that

case the Defendant had cross-examined the State's medical witness
and attempted to show that the witness had changed his theory as
to the course of a bullet that had killed the deceased, between
the time of the Preliminary Hearing and the time of Trial.

The

Trial Court then permitted the State's witness to read a part of
his autopsy report in order to show that the witness had not
changed his theory.

This approach is consistant with the Rules

stated above which allow the introduction of evidence impairing or
supporting the credibility of a witness.

In State vs. Herrera,

330 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1958) this Court found that the State's
attempt to impeach the testimony of it's own witness, a physician,
by intimating that his earlier report was contrary to his oral
testimony at Trial, without introducing the report into evidence,
was prejudicial error.

In the case at bar the Defense counsel

sought to impeach the credibility, not of it's own witness, but

of

-14-
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•

story. So we may recognize this third type of
allowable contradiction, namely, the contradiction
of any part of the witness's account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter of human experience he
would not have been mistaken about if his story
were true.
(Emphasis added) 571 P.2d at 1355;
citing Davenport vs. State, 519 P.2d 452, 454
(Alas. 1974)
Counsel for the Defense at the case at bar attempted at Trial
to introduce prior extrajudicial statements by the State's
Complaining Witnss which were inconsistant with his statements at
Trial.

These statements go to the heart of the issue of

Defendant's guilt, for they were the only evidence which the
State produced in support of attempting to prove the actual
elements of the crime.

Therefore these issues were not

collateral, but constituted that heart of the State's case.

The

impeachment of the State's witness on these issues should have
been allowed because he has given two different accounts of the
occurances of the crime the Defendant has been charged with, which
as a matter of human experience, he would not have been mistaken
about if his story were true.

Therefore impeachment of his

testimony should have been allowed, and exclusion of such evidence
by the Trial Court constitutes reversible error.

-16-
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the State's main witness, and correctly sought admission into
evidence of the Police Report containing the prior inconsistant
statements of said witness.

The Trial Court's wrongful exclusion

of the Police Report for impeachment purposes crippled the
ability of Defense Counsel to impeach the testimony of the State's
Complaining Witness.
In State vs. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977) this Court
held that the answers of a witness upon cross-examination of any
irrevelant or collateral matter are conclusive and binding, and
the witness may not be contradicted or impeached upon any
immaterial or isolated matter at issue.

The Supreme Court

reversed the Defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery because
the Trial Court had prohibited attempts by the Defense Counsel to
question the credibility of the testimony of certain of State's
witnesses, because they were under the influence of narcotics.
The Court said:
Suppose a witness has told a story of a transaction
crucial to the controversy. To prove him wrong in
some trivial detail of time, place or circumstance
is "collateral". But to prove untrue some facts
recited by the witness that if he were really there
and saw what he claims to have seen, he could not
have been mistaken about, is a convincing kind of
impeachment and the Courts must make place for, although the contradiction evidence is otherwise admissible because it is collateral ••. to disprove
such a fact is to pull out the linchpin of the
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF FORCIBLE SODOMY
A.
The Trial Court's exclusion of evidence
impeaching the credibility of the State's
only witness prejudicially affected the Defendant's substantial rights.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 77-35-30, as amended, Rule
30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall
be disregarded.
The exclusion at Trial below of the Police Report containing
the extrajudicial statements of the State's Complaining Witness,
which were recorded almost immediately after the disputed
incident, allowed the testimony of said witness to stand unopposed
by any other competant evidence.

The Defendant himself testified

at Trial that he had no recollection whatsoever of any of the
events which the Complaining Witness described.

Evidence was

presented on behalf of the Defense that the Defendant suffered
from a condition known as Pathalogical Intoxication.

(R.,at 55)

Expert testimony was given that there was an eighty percent (80%)
chance that the Defendant did not know what he was doing, had no
memory of what he did, and was not capable of any criminal intent
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to perform the acts of which he was accused.

(R., at 61) The

State's Complaining Witness was therefore allowed to describe the
situation in whatever fashion he chose, without being contradictea
by the Defendant or anyone else.

Counsel for the Defense was

prohibited from introducing evidence to impeach the testimony of
the State's Complaining Witness by introducing evidence of prior
statements by the witness which differed in material respects from
his statements at Trial.

Nor was the Defense allowed to elicit

testimony from the Investigating Police Officer at Trial as to his
memory regarding the Complaining Witness's prior statements.
Since the testimony of the Complaining Witness at Trial was a
reconstruction of events the witness could admittedly barely
remember, and consisted of hazy and brief recollections of
consciousness in between periods of passing out (R., at 20, 22,
32, 33) it is unreasonable to accord such testimony any great
evidentiary weight.

However since the Defendant himself was

unconscious and unable to controvert the Complaining Witness's
testimony, the Court's exclusion of contritictory evidence which
would impeach the Complaining Witness's testimony artificially
propped up and supported his account.

Weak though such testimony

may have been, it was the only evidence at all presented by the
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State to prove the elements of the crime alleged.

Therefore the

Trial Court rendered a judgment against Defendant.

However, had

the Police Report containing the prior extrajudicial statements of
the witness been admitted at Trial, even the Trial Court would
likely have been compelled to acquit the Defendant because of the
reasonable doubt raised as to the Defendant's guilt.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-1-501, provides in
part:
A Defendant
be innocent
against him
abscence of

in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
until each element of the offense charged
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
such proof, the Defendant shall be acquitted.

The evidence presented at the Trial below was so weak and
unconvincing as to appear unreasonable and insufficient as a
matter of law for the Defendant to have been convicted.

But this

is further aggravated by the Trial Court's wrongful exclusion of
evidence which impeaches the testimony of the State's only witness
as to the commission of the elements of the alleged crime.

In the

Police Report the State's witness complained that he had little
recollection of the occurrances at Defendant's residence after
they began drinking, but the witness alleges Defendant attempted
to perform anal intercourse with him.

No mention was made of any

alleged sexual act involving the mouth of the Defendant and the
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genitals of the Complaining Witness at all.

However at Trial the

State's witness only described an alleged act of oral sex, and
never directly or indirectly testified as to the Defendant's
alleged attempt at anal intercourse.

In response to Defense

Counsel's question as to whether or not Defendant attempted anal
intercourse, the Witness answered "Yes",

(R., at 30).

However the

Trial Court could see that the Witness did not understand the
question to which he had answered in the affirmative.

The only

evidence which the Trial Judge considered was the Witness's
testimony at Trial.

Clearly such testimony would have been weak

and unsupportable as a matter of law had the Trial Court allowed
impeachment, such that conviction would be impossible to all
reasonable minds.
In State vs. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975), this Court
vacated the Defendant's conviction of Rape and remanded the case
for a new Trial.

The evidence established that the association

between the Parties came about in a friendly and peaceful manner
and the allegation by the Complaining Witness of a transition into
violence raised a genuine and critical issue as to her consent.
Because the Trial Court excluded proffered evidence about the
Complaining Witness's reputation and moral character the Supreme
Court found that there may have been a different result had such
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evidence been allowed at Trial.

The Court stated the test for

determining whether or not an error was prejudicial as follows:
(I)f upon looking at the whole evidence it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there is
no substantial likelihood that the verdict would
have been different in the absence of the error,
it should be disregarded. But the reverse proposition is also true: That if there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the error,
there would have been a different result, the
error should be regarded as prejudicial.
(Emphasis
added) 544 P.2d 468, 469.
Had the Trial Court in the case at bar properly allowed
evidence to impeach the testimony of the State's only witness as
to the elements of the crime, there is a substantial likelihood
that a different result would have been reached.

Therefore the

error by the Trial Court in excluding the impeachment evidence
must be deemed to have been prejudicial, and the guilty verdict
reversed.
In State vs. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), this Court·
reversed the Defendant's conviction at Trial for Distribution for
Value of a Controlled Substance.

The Defendant had appealed his

conviction on grounds that, amoung other things, the Prosecution
had made oblique but impermissible references to the failure of
the Defendant to testify in his own behalf.

The Court stated:

Consistant with the nature of criminal proceedings
and the protections accorded those accused of crime
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under our law, including the presumption of innocence
and the burdon of the State to prove the Defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we believe that, on
appeal, when there is a reasonable doubt as to whether
the error below was prejudicial, that doubt should
be resolved in favor of the Defendant. (Emphasis added)
569 P.2d at 1116.
In the instant case there is a reasonable likelihood that in
the absence of the erroneous exclusion of impeachment evidence by
the Trial Judge the Court would not have been able to arrive at a
verdict of guilty.
CONCLUSION
Because the testimony of the State's Witness regarding the
alleged elements of the crime consisted of hazy recollections
during intermittent and brief periods of consciousness, reasonable
minds could not believe beyond every reasonable doubt that the
Defendant was guilty of the crime charged.

The evidence presented

in support of that allegation was simply insufficient as a matter
of law.

The Trial Court's action in excluding evidence which

would further impeach the testimony of the State's Witness,
artificially propped up and supported that testimony.

Defendant's

conviction resulted from an error committed by the Trial Court
which prejudicially affected the Defendant's substantial rights.
Therefore Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
the verdict of guilty rendered against him in the Court below.
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